Probability matching is a classic choice anomaly that has been studied extensively. While many approaches assume that it is a cognitive shortcut driven by cognitive limitations, recent literature suggests that it is not a strategy per se, but rather another outcome of people's well-documented misperception of randomness. People search for patterns even in random sequences, which results in probability matching at the outcome level. Previous studies have supported this by the finding that distracting people with a secondary verbal working memory task presumably prevents the pattern search, resulting in more maximizing behavior that is considered more rational. The current paper demonstrates with two experiments that there is actually truth in both accounts. For some participants, probability matching indeed seems to be the result of a cognitive shortcut, a simple ''win-stay, loseshift" strategy, and in one experiment identified these as participants low in working memory capacity. For others, however, a potentially smart pattern search strategy underlies probability matching. These probability matchers (who still look irrational in the absence of patterns) actually have a higher chance of finding a pattern if one exists. Contrary to the almost uniformly negative perception of probability matching, we therefore conclude that there can be a potentially smart strategy behind probability matching.
Introduction
''Clarice, does this random scattering of sites seem overdone to you? Doesn't it seem desperately random? Random past all possible convenience? Does it suggest to you the elaborations of a bad liar?" (Harris, 1988 (Harris, /1991 .
In Thomas Harris's ''The Silence of the Lambs", the psychiatrist Dr. Hannibal Lecter, an imprisoned murderous cannibal, helps FBI agent Clarice Starling find a serial killer. His comment on a map of the sites where the victims were found is crucial: The serial killer tries to hide his location among seemingly random sites, but by being too random to be credibly random, he unintentionally helps agent Starling discover an important pattern that leads to him.
This example illustrates both that people are not overly successful in producing randomness and that they are very good in detecting patterns. Both may be two sides of the same coin -the well-documented misperception of randomness (e.g., Bar-Hillel & Wagenaar, 1991) may facilitate the early detection of patterns (Lopes, 1982) . Sometimes, however, people even detect patterns where there are none, and it is easier to convince them that a sequence is structured than that it is random (Hyman & Jenkin, 1956) .
Probability matching, a classic choice anomaly, could be a further consequence of misperceiving randomness. In a typical experiment, people have to predict which of two events that have different probabilities of occurring will take place. For example, event E1 could occur with a probability of p(E1) = .67, while event E2 occurs with p(E2) = 1 À p(E1) = .33. Given that the sequence of events is random, the best strategy would be always to predict the more frequent event E1. This strategy is called maximizing and would yield an average accuracy of 67%. However, most often probability matching is observed, that is, predicting the events in proportion to their probability of
